What Can’t Be Mass-Produced: The Frontier of Feminization

There is a growing sense amongstwestern analysts and officials that the toll the Russo-Ukraine conflict has hadon Russia’s conventional forces is severe. A picture has emerged of a militarily impotent Russia solely reliant on its nuclear deterrent to maintain its posture against NATO forces. In a Jan 18 New York Times article, retired General Ben Hodges is quoted saying the Biden Administration is“recognizing that the threat of Russian escalation is perhaps not what theythought it was earlier,” with RAND’s Dara Massicot adding that they now have“more clarity on their [Russia] tolerance for damage and attacks,” as theydownplayed fears of escalation.

They argued that the US should help Ukraine threaten Crimea. Further assuaging escalation fears, a report from the Institute for the Study of War claims that the West “should not self-deter,” goading on the continuous crossing of “Putin’s supposed red lines” as Ukraine has been provided with ever-increasing levels of military assistance. These are only a few of the countless examples highlighting the growing beliefin Russia’s military feebleness, all denoting a triumphalist spirit. Granting that this sentiment may in part be an element of ongoing perception-manipulation campaigns in the West, decision-makers are presenting themselves as operating under the assumption that Russia is impotent.

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Before plunging into the issue at hand, we must first define the eponymous “red lines”: diplomatic thresholds that mark a change in character in international conflict. Delineation and demarcation are primary concerns in international politics, from the literal lines defining geographic borders to the more nebulous cultural and ethnic delineations between their populations. Currently, there is a variety of geographic content, from the South China Sea 9-dash line and the India-China border to the lesser-known Papua New Guinea conflict with Indonesia. Cultural lines are exemplified by the South US-North economic cluster, which has seen these cultures blur despite the accurately enforced border line.

Russia’s stated red lines:

• Provision of long-range weaponry with theability to target deep into Russian territory, in cities such as St. Petersburgand Moscow
• Provision of nuclear weaponry
• Direct NATO intervention in the SMO

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Over the course of the war, a series of “red lines” havebeen crossed, primarily in the form of growing levels of military assistance. Theorigin of these artificial limits is complicated. It is difficult to ascertain which are official in nature and which are the product of perception manipulation on both sides of the conflict. However, it is clear that there have been limits to the degree to which the West has supported Ukraine and to the level of Russian commitment to the war effort. Western aid primarily revolves around arbitrary specifications on the type of materiel provided to Ukraine, whether a weapon is offensive or defensive, how advanced it is, whether it could be used to attack Russia proper, and so forth. My emphasis on the arbitrary nature of these limits is important because it underscores their inherent fluidity and the lack of true guiding principles amongst stakeholders. For instance, there was ample public debate in the lead-up to the delivery of HIMARS, a long-range artillery system, on whether its delivery would lead to Russian escalation. HIMARS presents a very modest upgrade over existing Ukrainian platforms, such as the BM-30 Smerch or the domestically produced Vilkha, both of which have missiles with longer ranges than those provided to Ukraine by HIMARS.

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The Ukrainian-made Vilkha R624 rocket has the same range and CEP as the US-provided HIMARS rockets. Interestingly, Russian officials responded with threats of escalation within the perceived range. This is an example of the nature of these red lines: lacking objectivity, they are entirely about control over the information space. Both Russia and the West know that HIMARS was not significantly different from systems Ukraine had, yet they both framed the debate in terms of the system’s ability to threaten targets deeper within Russia. In the leadupto the first deliveries of HIMARS, Russian foreign minister Lavrov threatenedthat “the longer the range of armaments that you[US] will supply, the furtheraway we will move from our territory the line, beyond which Neo-Nazi canthreaten the Russian Federation,” making it clear that the problem is one ofsecuring Russian strategic depth, which is at least consistent with the statedgoals of their invasion of Ukraine.

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Somewhat contradicting this position, Putin proclaimed that “there is nothing new” about these systems, as the “Ukrainian army operates similar” artillery systems, thus downplaying their significance and in no way threatening further escalation upon their delivery. However, he did utter an escalation threat should the US provide ATACMs ballisticmissiles alongside the HIMARS, which have yet to be provided, and it is unclearwhether they will ever be. Again, we here find some consistency in Russia’smessaging of red lines, which seem to run along the primary objective of the war in Ukraine: securing strategic depth for Russian territory. With this in mind, we can contextualize Lavrov's threats, as the escalation threat was made amid uncertainty about the US supply of these long-range missiles that could strike deep within Russia’s territory.